Design of an LNG tank for accidental loads in Finland by Martínez Cutillas, Francisco Javier et al.
Design of an LNG Tank for Accidental Loads in Finland 
 
Francisco MARTÍNEZ 
Operations Manager  
Principia  
Madrid, Spain 
francisco.martinez@principia.es 
 
Francisco Martínez, born 1963, 
received his PhD in civil 
engineering from the Madrid 
School of Civil Engineering. He 
has extensive experience in the 
design of LNG tanks, especially 
in relation with the effects of 
accidental loads.  
 
 
 Miguel Ángel ASTIZ 
Project Manager 
Carlos Fernández Casado. 
Madrid, Spain  
maastiz@cfcsl.com 
 
Miguel A. Astiz, born 1950, was 
a graduate student at Stanford 
University and has a PhD from 
the Madrid School of  Civil 
Engineering where he holds the 
Chair of Bridge Engineering. He 
has extensive experience in the 
design of bridges and pre-stressed 
structures such as LNG tanks.. 
 
 Rafael FERNÁNDEZ  
Director LNG Division  
FCC Industrial  
Madrid, Spain 
RFernandez@fcc.es 
 
Rafael Fernández, born 1955, 
received his civil engineering 
degree from the Madrid School 
of Civil Engineering. He has 12 
years of experience in LNG 
facilities and has been involved 
in the construction of 8 tanks. 
 
 
 
Summary 
The first tank in Finland for storage of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is currently being built in the 
port of Pori. It is a full containment tank, capable for 30,000 m3. Two of the many load cases 
considered in the design correspond to postulated accidents that give rise to complex thermal-
mechanical problems and are of especial interest in the Pori tank: the major leak event (in which the 
liquid at -168ºC contacts the concrete outer tank) and the external fire (with the tank being 
subjected to large thermal fluxes from a postulated fire). The paper describes the calculations 
conducted to verify that the design adopted satisfies the success criteria established for those events. 
Keywords: liquefied natural gas tanks; major leak; fire; thermal-mechanical problems.  
 
1. Introduction 
The first tank in Finland for storage of liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) is currently being built in the Tahkoluoto 
terminal in the port of Pori. The overall works include a 
storage tank where the liquid LNG is temporarily kept, 
facilities for transferring LNG to barges and lorries, and a 
vaporisation plant to return the liquid to gas form for 
distribution and use. The present paper is primarily 
concerned with the design of the storage tank from the 
structural point of view. 
The tank has a storage capacity of 30,000 m3 and is of the 
full containment type, which indicates that it is designed 
to maintain impermeability to both liquid and gas at the 
operating temperature of -168ºC. Tanks of this type are 
actually double tanks, composed of an outer tank and a 
self-supporting inner tank. The outer tank consists of a 
pre-stressed concrete cylindrical wall, capped by a 
reinforced concrete spherical dome and supported on a 
reinforced concrete slab. The inner tank is an open top 
cylindrical tank, made of cryogenic 9% Ni steel in order to 
ensure good ductility at operating temperatures. 
Traditionally, the connection of the wall and the base slab 
is protected by cryogenic steel and foamglass insulation 
up to an elevation of 5 m, a detail known as the thermal 
corner protection (TCP). Also, perlite insulation is placed Fig. 1: Cross-section of the tank 
 
between the two tanks to minimise heat exchanges across the outer tank and the associated liquid 
boil-off. The base slab is heated to prevent the ground from freezing under the tank to avoid heave 
and volume changes in the ground, since the structure, especially the inner tank, is rather sensitive 
to differential settlements. 
2. Description of the tank and materials 
The Pori tank, a typical cross-section of which appears in Fig.1, is supported on 196 drilled steel 
piles filled with concrete. The wall of the outer tank has an internal radius of 20.35 m and a 
thickness of 0.60 m. The space left between the 
inner and outer tanks is 1 m, the inner 0.30 m 
occupied by the resilient blanket and 0.70 m 
filled with perlite.  
The external wall is built with C40/50 concrete. 
Its uniaxial compressive behaviour is shown in 
Fig. 2 for ambient and higher temperatures; the 
improvement in properties experienced for 
lower temperatures has been conservatively 
neglected. The temperature dependence of the 
thermal properties, such as specific heat, was 
also taken into account. The concrete was 
described with a continuum, plasticity-based, 
damage model. It assumes that the two main 
failure mechanisms are tensile cracking and 
compressive crushing. The evolution of the 
yield surface is controlled by two hardening 
variables linked to those two failure 
mechanisms. 
Two types of steel are used: reinforcing 
KRYBAR-165 for locations with cryogenic 
requirements and B500 otherwise. The basic 
mechanical properties at 20ºC of the reinforcing 
steel, the pre-stressing steel, and the concrete 
are summarised in Table 1. 
 
 
A uniform arrangement of reinforcing bars, 
20@200, is used for both the inner and outer wall surfaces of the wall. There are 64 pre-stressing 
tendons in the vertical direction with a cross-section of 2400 mm2 and are pre-stressed to 3.348 
MN; for the horizontal tendons the corresponding figures are 42, 2100 mm2, and 2.929 MN. 
Standard elasto-plastic descriptions were used for the steel of both the reinforcing bars and the pre-
stressing tendons. 
3. Postulated accidents and requirements 
In Europe the design of LNG tanks is governed by the standard EN 14620 [1]. The structure must 
satisfy a number of requirements in respect of the service limit state (SLS) and the ultimate limit 
state (ULS). Apart from the usual gravity, pre-stressing and operating loads, stringent criteria must 
be satisfied in respect of test loads (the hydraulic test, in which the tank is filled with water to reach 
pressures 25% above the operating LNG pressures) and, particularly, accidental loads. 
Seismic demands tend to be among the governing accidental loads in these tanks, but they are very 
secondary at Pori because of its exceptionally quiet seismic environment. The load cases discussed 
Fig. 2: Concrete uniaxial compressive behaviour 
Table 1: Mechanical properties at 20ºC 
Mechanical property Concrete Reinf. steel Cryog. steel Prestress. steel 
Young’s modulus (GPa) 35.0 200 200 200 
Poisson’s ratio (-) 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Yield stress (MPa) - 500 460 1,770 
Tensile strength (MPa) - - - 1,860 
Density (kg/m³) 2,500 7,850 7,850 7,850 
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here are the major leak (whereupon the LNG is assumed to leak into the annular space between the 
two tanks), and an external fire (in which the tank is subjected to a history of radiating fluxes from a 
postulated external fire). Other events such as missile impact, overpressures from deflagration of a 
hydrocarbon cloud, etc., are studied but cannot be discussed within the limits of this paper. 
In the major leak accident, when LNG is assumed to leak into the annular space, four situations are 
considered, corresponding to different elevations reached by the liquid; all major leaks are assumed 
to last sufficiently for steady state thermal conditions to develop. In the external fire the heat flux 
received by the tank evolves with time: during the first hour a heat flux of 42 kW/m2 is applied on 
the wall, which reduces to 32 kW/m2 for the next 5 hours. 
The specific requirements include limitations on the width of the cracks developed in the concrete 
(0.3 mm), a minimum residual compressed zone (RCZ) in the concrete (90 mm), a minimum value 
of the compressive force maintained by the concrete in the wall (400 kN/m), an upper limit on the 
plastified wall thickness (50 mm) and a minimum thickness of the elastic zone (100 mm); also, 
neither the reinforcing bars nor the pre-stressing tendons are allowed to yield. 
4. Analysis of major leaks 
As mentioned earlier, in a major leak the liquid LNG is assumed to leak into the annular space 
between the two tanks and to impose its temperatures on all wetted surfaces. The four liquid levels 
considered are 7.0, 10.0, 15.0, and 22.8 m. Given the weak coupling of the thermal and mechanical 
problems, a thermal analysis was conducted first for each leak configuration, followed by a 
mechanical analysis that incorporates the thermal results as input. All calculations, for both the 
major leak and the external fire, were performed with Abaqus [3]. 
4.1 Thermal analyses 
Thermal analyses are needed to establish both the initial conditions before the accident and the 
steady state temperatures for the different liquid levels. The results are imported for conducting the 
mechanical analyses. Five steady-state temperature distributions were calculated, corresponding to: 
a) Normal operation. Temperatures in normal operation are obtained for a normal ambient 
temperature of 5.0ºC. The air temperature is imposed on the outer surface of the wall, the 
top surface of the dome, and the lower surface of the bottom slab. All surfaces in contact 
with the liquid are assumed to be at -168ºC, which is the LNG design temperature. 
b) Major leak. Four temperature distributions were also calculated for the four major leak 
hypotheses, in which a temperature of -168ºC is imposed on surfaces wetted by the LNG. 
The temperature of the outer surface is 5ºC, which is the normal ambient temperature. 
The heating system is also introduced: 20.66 W/m² in the central region of the slab and a 
circumferential heating of 31.44 W/m² below the foamglass insulation, both active 50% of the time. 
Of special interest is the case of the full major leak, in which the liquid reaches a level of 22.8 m. 
The analysis indicates that cryogenic reinforcement, needed for temperatures below -20ºC, must be 
used in the inner face of the tank wall at all elevations between 4.3 m and 27.7 m. Also, relatively 
sharp vertical thermal gradients occur around the top of the TCP and in the region near the free 
surface of the liquid, with important effects on the local concrete stresses. 
4.2 Mechanical analyses 
The initial stress state of the structure correspond to normal operating conditions. The mechanical 
analyses then consist of three sequential steps, in which loads are applied as described below: 
a) Pre-stressing loads. The tendon loads are kept constant in the course of this first step. The 
analysis determines the stable configuration on which additional loads will be applied. 
b) Vapour pressure, liquid pressure and gravity. These include a vapour pressure of 40 kPa, the 
hydrostatic pressure corresponding to each liquid level, and gravity loads. 
c) Thermal loads. The temperatures arising from the major leak accident are now introduced, 
which generates most of the cracking and redistribution of stresses. 
 
As an example, for the case of the full major leak with the liquid reaching a level of 22.8 m, Figs. 3 
and 4 present the vertical and hoop stresses in the regions of the main transitions. For lack of space, 
the stresses at the connection between the wall and the dome are not shown here. All stresses re-
main below 40 MPa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figs. 5 and 6 show the thickness of the RCZ for the vertical and hoop stresses, respectively, for the 
four liquid levels; as required, they exceed 90 mm. To guarantee the containment function of the 
outer tank, the compressive force per unit length of the wall must exceed 400 kN/m. Alyhough not 
shown here, both the vertical and hoop forces satisfy the requirement for all four liquid levels.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Hoop stressess near the top of the 
TCP and the free surface 
Fig. 3: Vertical stressess near the top of the 
TCP and the free surface 
Fig. 5: Vertical residual compressed zone for 
various leak levels 
Fig. 6: Horizontal residual compressed zone for 
various leak levels 
 
 
The stresses in the reinforcement are also limited to 460 MPa; Figs. 7 and 8 present those stresses, 
together with the allowable limit. For the pre-stressing tendons, the stresses should not exceed 1770 
MPa; as shown in Figs. 9 and 10, these requirements are again fulfilled. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The crack widths, calculated from the reinforcement stresses for the four leak cases, are plotted to-
gether with the allowable limits in Figs. 11 and 12. Limiting the width to 0.3 mm around the TCP 
anchor intends to prevent leakage paths in that area. 
The shear demands and capacities were evaluated along the wall to ensure that the reinforcement 
provided is adequate. The mechanical (total minus thermal) strains in the concrete were also com-
Fig. 8: Stresses in horizontal reinforcement Fig. 7: Stresses in vertical reinforcement 
Fig. 9: Stresses in vertical tendons Fig. 10: Stresses in horizontal tendons 
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puted to verify that they remain below 0.23%, especially in the outer face of the wall, which experi-
ences greater compression. Table 2 summarises the main verifications for elevations above 4 m. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Analysis of external fire 
As mentioned, the heat fluxes specified evolve with time: during the first hour a heat flux of 42 
kW/m2 is applied on the outer tank wall, which reduces to 32 kW/m2 for the next five hours. As its 
surface temperature increases, the outer wall radiates heat, characterised with an emissivity 
coefficient of 0.63 [2]. Finally, the inner surface of the insulation layer is kept at -168ºC. As for the 
major leaks, the thermal problem was solved first, followed by the structural analysis. 
5.1 Thermal problem 
The thermal problem was addressed assuming axial symmetry and an infinite wall. The mesh 
represented the resilient blanket, the perlite, and the concrete. Wall temperatures evolve due to the 
heat flux imposed by the fire and that radiated by the wall. 
Fig. 13 presents the temperatures in one hour intervals. The maximum temperature in the wall is 
675ºC, at which the heat radiated by the wall balances the incoming heat flux from the fire. 
Temperatures in the horizontal and vertical tendons remain below 185ºC and 54ºC, respectively. 
The consequences of the external fire are fairly independent of the initial temperatures outside the 
Fig. 11: Vertical crack width 
Table 2: Verifications above elevation 4 m 
Fig. 12: Horizontal crack width 
Requirement Horizontal Vertical Limit 
Concrete compressive stress (MPa) 19.9 28.9 <40 
Rebar stress (MPa) 247.7 207.3 <460 
Pre-stressing tendon stress (MPa) 1288 1365 <1770 
Compressed zone, RCZ (mm)  120 210 >90 
Force per unit length, NRCZ (kN/m) 500 2705 >400 
Average compression, σRCZ (MPa) 4.2 - >1 
Concrete mechanical strain (%) 0.05 0.10 <0.23 
Crack width around TCP (mm) 0.27 0.24 <0.30 
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tank. Also, because of the thermal inertia of the wall, the fire induces noticeable temperature 
changes only in the outer 20-30 cm of the wall. 
5.2 Mechanical problem 
The model used includes the vertical and 
horizontal tendons, as well as the 
reinforcing bars in the outer and inner 
faces of the wall. The concrete was 
represented with the same non-linear 
model of the previous section, except that 
its properties deteriorate with temperature. 
Since pre-stressing levels are not uniform 
in the wall, four sections were monitored, 
at 1.5, 5.7, 8.1, and 24.2 m.  
The vertical and hoop stresses across the 
thickness of the wall are shown in Fig. 14 
for one of the monitored sections; the 
compressed thickness always exceeds 100 
mm. The vertical and hoop strains appear 
in Fig. 15; none of the concrete regions 
suffer plastic deformations. Table 3 
summarises the compliance with the 
requirements for the section with the more 
severe demands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 13: Temperatures in 1 hr intervals 
Table 3: Stresses developed in the different steel elements for section D 
Structural elements Stress (MPa) Temperature (ºC) Limit (MPa) 
Vertical cryogenic rebars 211 5 460 
Hoop cryogenic rebars 417 4 460 
Vertical prestressing tendons 1421 54 1770 
Hoop prestressing tendons 1153 185 1770 
Hoop normal rebars -261 486 500 
Vertical normal rebars -307 444 500 
Fig. 15: Strain distributions in concrete Fig. 16: Stress distributions in concrete 
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6. Conclusions 
The paper described the thermal-mechanical calculations conducted to verify that the design of the 
Pori tank satisfies the design requirements in respect of two postulated events: various levels of 
major leaks and an external fire. The calculations were carried out with the finite element code 
Abaqus, using temperature dependent properties for all materials, a damage plasticity model for 
mass concrete, and elasto-plastic formulations for the reinforcing bars and pre-stressing tendons. 
As a result of the work conducted, the following conclusions can be proposed: 
a) As a general conclusion, it can be stated that all of the design requirements are satisfied 
under both the major leak conditions and the external fire scenario. 
b) The basic verifications included the thickness of the residual compressed zone (RCZ), the 
compressive forces per unit length of wall, the stress levels in reinforcing bars and pre-
stressing tendons, the crack widths developed, the shear demands on the wall section, and 
the compressive mechanical strains. 
c) Cryogenic reinforcement is required in the inner face of the wall at elevations between 4.3 
and 27.7 m, as their temperatures go below -20ºC during the major leak. 
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